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REPATRIATION UNDER CONFLICT
The background to any contemporary refugee report tends to 
be doleful and bleak. In the 1980s the number of refugees 
doubled to approximately 15 million persons in needjof 
protection and assistance while the budget of the United Nations 
High Commisioner for Refugees (UNHCR) remained relatively 
frozen. While going through a donor-initiated financial crisis, 
UNHCR also had the disorienting problem of three Hi<jjh 
Commissioners in just over one year. For refugees, the increase
Jin their numbers combined with inadequate contributions from 
donors and weakened institutional capacity has meant: 
malnutrition for refugee children in Ethiopia and Malawi; cuts 
in educational programs and other means for building human hope 
and capacity; deferral or cancellation of voluntary repatriationI
programs to Angola and Mozambique, of local integration programs 
in Somalia, and in development-oriented assistance programs in 
Iran, the Sudan, and Pakistan; and delays in responding to the 
Liberian refugee crisis.
The number of refugees is increasing due to a 1 lack of 
durable solutions to refugee problems. The three durable
jsolutions are voluntary repatriation to the country of origin, 
local settlement in the country of first asylum, and 
resettlement in a third country. A durable solution requires
I
the integration--citizenship or permanent status--of a refugee 
into a society. For many refugees only long-term temporary 
asylum is available. The increase in the total number of 
refugees is not due to any recent increase in the outflow of new
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refugees. Rather, the problem is that once on the refugee 
register, many refugees remain there, seemingly forever.
Refugees from the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and the early 
1980s are still on the assistance list, along with their 
children and grandchildren. Refugee problems demand durable 
solutions, not only because of the cost and burden on host 
countries and the international community, and the waste of the 
refugees lives but because in their second, third and fourth 
generation refugees can be a violent and destabilizing social 
ulcer. In October 1990, Rwandese refugees in Uganda invaded 
their homeland: "Rwandese refugees, people who have been in
exile— stateless and spiritually homeless— for three decades, 
people whose long-term pain and frustration provide the context 
from which the war has sprung."3*
Beyond the tragedy of becoming a refugee is the additional 
tragedy that almost no country is willing to accept 
responsibility for refugees. A few countries receiving ethnic 
kin provide not only shelter but also the rights and privileges 
of citizenship. Otherwise, the truth is that no one welcomes or 
wants refugees; countries want to be rid of the problem or 
somehow pass the buck to others. The responsibility for 
refugees is shared by all, which really means that no country 
takes responsibility for a durable solution. Most host 
countries, no matter how hospitable, see refugees as a burden 
that should be shared with the international community.
Refugees may be well-treated but they will not become citizens 
or permanent residents; rather the hosts insist that eventually
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the refugees exercise the best solution, to return home.
Some refugees are able to escape this limbo of waiting to go 
home by resettling in third countries; however, the number of 
refugees resettled each year is so small that the worldwide 
total of refugees continues to grow. If the number of refugees 
is to be reduced, it will be by means of voluntary repatriation.
This article describes the process of voluntary 
repatriation of refugees and the decision-making of refugees 
confronted with unsatisfactory options. It presents some patterns 
of repatriation that have emerged from an international Study of 
Spontaneous Voluntary Repatriation. We believe that many of the 
beliefs and principles commonly applied by governments, 
international assistance agencies, and the public to the problem 
of voluntary repatriation do not fit the reality of contemporary 
repatriation both with regard to the situations in which it is 
likely to occur and the most common forms it will take.
The contemporary international beliefs and principles 
regarding repatriation assume that return to one's homeland will 
be purely voluntary, will be assisted and monitored by 
governments and international agencies under the terms of a 
tripartite agreement between the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the governments of the 
refugees' country of origin and the country of asylum, and that 
the refugees' complete safety and socio-economic integration 
will be assured. For example, at the last meeting of UNHCR's 
Executive Committee, the representative of the Holy See
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indicated the:
need to ensure that voluntary repatriation - the best 
solution to uprooting - really was voluntary. In order to 
do that refugees must be told what opportunities for reintegration into their home countries they would 
actually have, and it must be ensured that they could 
return in complete safety.
Unfortunately, it is the rare refugee situation that will allow 
for such orderly and organized return. International activities 
based on the above assumptions may be irrelevant for the needs 
of most refugees.
The changing nature of refugee problems has altered the 
contemporary practice of voluntary repatriation. For a while 
during the 1960s and early 1970s many refugees were able to 
repatriate after the successful conclusion of struggles for 
independence and liberation from colonial rule. However, for 
more than a decade, most refugee-producing conflicts have 
involved the newly-independent states and have been based on 
issues of internal nation-building, revolutionary change, or 
conflicts with neighbors. This has caused, in the words of 
former High Commissioner Hartling, "the massive arrivals of 
refugees in low-income countries where often no durable 
solutions are at hand."
Today, most voluntary repatriations occur under conflict, 
without a decisive political event such as national 
independence, without any change in the regime or the conditions 
that originally caused flight. Countless individual refugees 
and sizeable groups of well-organized refugees return home in 
the face of continued risk, frequently without any amnesty,
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without a repatriation agreement or program, without the 
permission of the authorities in either the country of asylum or 
of origin, without international knowledge or assistance, and
Returning refugees to their homelands under these circumstances
decision-makers and participate in determining the modalities of 
movement and the conditions of reception. Refugee-induced 
repatriation is a self-regulating process on the refugees’ own 
terms. The refugees apply their own criteria to their situationj
in exile and to conditions in their homeland and will return 
home if it is safe and better by their standards.
Below are brief descriptions of five recent repatriations; 
to Namibia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and El Salvador. 
Only the first example, Namibia, fits the conditions1 for orderly 
and organized, internationally assisted repatriation. The other
repatriations are more ambiguous and disorderly. Where the 
returns are organized, that organization is induced and 
controlled by the refugees.
NAMIBIA. Joyous occasions are relatively rare when dealing 
with refugee problems. One such date was 21 March 1990 when 
Namibia became independent after decades of struggle. In 
anticipation of independence 43,387 Nambian refugees were
without an end to the conflict that caused the exodus.
will require new thinking about voluntary repatriation and the 
ways of promoting it.
The refugees are the main actors in the contem 




repatriated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) from Angola, Zambia, and 40 other countries. The 
refugees were registered while in exile, airlifted home, 
processed in reception centers, given rehabilitation assistance 
by a number of international agencies, and one year of food 
rations and material assistance to facilitate their integration 
into local society.
MOZMABIQUE. Mozambique is not as fortunate as Namibia; 
independent since 1975, it continues to be racked by nighmarish 
civil war. The RENAMO insurgency practices terror tactics 
against civilians, with many instances of massacre and 
mutilation of innocents. Mozambique has produced over one 
million refugees and a roughly equal number of internally 
displaced persons. Yet, in 1990, UNHCR reported that 4,400 refugees 
returned to Mozambique with UNHCR assistance, but that "as of 31 
December 1989 ... the number of returnees from Malawi, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe was 208,000 persons, the 
great majority of whom had returned spontaneously." The lion’s 
share, 98% of the Mozambican refugees, returned of their own 
accord, with little or no international assistance to a homeland 
in conflict.
t t g ray. In 1985, some 68,000 Tigrayan refugees returned from 
the Sudan to Ethiopia at the height of the drought and famine, 
during a period of stepped-up military activity. The first 
returns occurred while massive numbers were still evacuating 
central Tigray. The return was aided by the indigenous Relief 
Society of Tigray (REST) and "protected" by the Tigrayan
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People's Liberation Front. Both UNHCR and the United States 
Government actively opposed the return, and only the Sudan gave 
limited assistance. Despite great fears, most refugees returned 
home in good health, but without adequate agricultural inputs to 
securely re-establish themselves. Indeed, in 1986 even larger 
numbers (77,000) returned; some with limited international 
assistance. By the end of 1987, 164,000 of the original 190,000 
Tigrayans to enter Sudan had returned home.
AFGHANISTAN. Afghanistan has produced the largest current 
refugee exodus; approximately six million refugees fled to 
Pakistan and Iran in the last decade due to internal 
revolutionary change backed by the 1979 Soviet invasion.
Despite the Soviet withdrawal of its troops in early 1989, the 
internal war has not ended; Muslim resistance forces battle 
against the Soviet-supported Kabul regime. New fighting 
continues to create refugees and discourages the return of those 
in exile. Furthermore, UNHCR reported that "the experience in 
1989 showed that certain groups had often actively discouraged 
or prevented spontaneous return movements." It is charged that 
some guerrilla groups oppose any repatriation and have laid 
mines on road along which refugees pass and have mobile military 
units to prevent the return of refugees. Nonetheless, UNHCR 
reported:
There were indications that sizeable spontaneous return 
movements were taking place in 1990 to rural areas in the 
south and south-western parts of Afghanistan, with the 
possibility that up to 150,000 persons would have returned 
by the end of the year.
In the same vein, last year's World Refugee Survey reported:
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Thousands of people every month were estimated to have 
returned to their homes in rural areas. Spontaneous 
returns of internally displaced persons out of Kabul and 
other towns were reported to the rural parts ... that had 
been especially hard hit in the war. ... Many of the returnees were men coming in advance of their families to 
clear fields and repair damaged homes. Rural areas, for 
the most part, remain outside government control.
EL SALVADOR. As a last example of the varieties of 
repatriation, one needs to examine the masivas. the large- 
scale refugee-organized returns from camps in Honduras to 
communities in El Salvador "still considered zones of conflict." 
For most of a decade in Honduras, the Salvadoran refugees were 
virtual prisoners in closed camps under constant harassment from 
a suspicious and dangerous Honduran military. Although they 
felt hopeless about their life in Honduras, the Salvadoran 
refugees did not feel powerless. They organized to return as a 
community so they "could take control over their own lives and 
confront their enemies as an organized force." There had been 
many individual refugee returns from the camps; but it was 
believed that even though those individuals had returned 
discreetly, without calling attention to themselves, they were 
subject to torture, jail and massacre in El Salvador. "In 
contrast to the individual refugees ... the refugees 
participating in the masivas were intentionally testing the 
political space in El Salvador."®
Between October 1987 and late 1989 there were four masivas 
from the Mesa Grande refugee camps, ranging from 800 to over 
4,000 refugees. Nearly 8,000 refugees returned to areas of 




originally planned to place the returnees in the less 
conflictive zone of southern Usulutan Department and 
provide land, building and farming materials, and other 
basic needs. Refugee leaders, however, rejected the 
proposal and insisted that the returnees be allowed to 
repatriate to areas of their choice from where many had 
originated. The government eventually agreed to their 
demands. (
In May 1989, the refugees in Colomoncagua camp announced they
were ready to return together to "build peace"; a few months
later the refugees at San Antonio camp made a similar
declaration. The State Department reported:
On November 18, [1989] approximately 1,250 refugees left 
the Colomoncagua camp, the largest in Honduras, and 
crossed the border, disregarding Salvadoran Government and 
UNHCR immigration and repatriation procedures!. The 
refugees repatriated in the middle of the FMLN [Farabundo 
Marti Liberation Front] November offensive. j
The Salvadoran refugees in the first masiva established "ai
pattern of confrontations about disagreements between the
refugees and private agencies on one side, and the Salvadoran
Governmenton the other."3 These conditions also challenged
UNHCR's "traditional role as a humanitarian and apolitical
mediator." Fagen and Eldridge have noted that:
The refugees initiated the maslvas and took charge of 
their own organization and preparation. ... The four 
Mesa Grande repatriations were all confrontational. ...The 
collective repatriations were intended to demonstrate that 
the refugees could control their own lives; hence they 
challenged terms of repatriation they considered to have 
been imposed upon them rather than initiated by them ... 
regardless of whether the decisions might be in their 
long-term interest.In insisting on points which they knew would be 
rejected the refugees also wished to demonstrate to the 




Of the five repatriations described above, only the 
Namibian repatriation fits contemporary international 
assumptions, beliefs and principles regarding return. If the 
refugees had not engaged in independent decision-making and 
organizing, the returns to Mozambique, Tigray, Afghanistan, and 
El Salvador would not have occurred. Those four refugee- 
induced returns total approximately 543,000 refugees, and they 
are not the only refugee-induced returns in the last few years.
What has happened to the tired, poor, huddled masses of 
refugees, the passive, powerless wretched refuse yearning for 
international assistance and guidance? The international system 
has failed to provide durable solutions for refugees. As a 
result, some refugees are taking matters into their own hands and 
becoming major actors in the repatriation process.
In the last few years UNHCR has made significant efforts 
to more actively promote voluntary repatriation. In several 
Central American repatriations UNHCR undertook innovative 
measures to protect refugees, remain in contact with all 
parties, and promote return. Nonetheless, despite its 
importance as a durable solution, voluntary repatriation, 
particularly under conflict, is a difficult solution for UNHCR 
to implement. Given the irregular nature of many contemporary 
refugee movements, many refugees never register with UNHCR while 
in the country of asylum. The forces controlling the area to 
which the refugees return may not be those of the sovereign 
government recognized by the UN. Countries of origin often 
assume returnees are part of an insurgent movement and thus
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refuse to approve their return. Many refugees fear that going 
through official channels to repatriate and being "turned over" 
to their government would put them in danger or mark them as 
suspect. Lastly, although UNHCR's tripartite approach to 
repatriation is useful and important, its pace is often slow and 
does not reflect the refugees' own pace and criteria for 
decision making. In many situations, refugees return on their 
own rather than wait for formal action by UNHCR.
Voluntary repatriation has received relatively little 
study. Several studies are now underway at the Refugee Policy 
Group and at the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development. The study— International Study of Spontaneous 
Voluntary Repatriation— on which this article is based is the 
oldest. It supported by the Ford Foundation, the Intertect 
Institute, Michigan State University, Georgetown University's 
Hemispheric Migration Project, and the Canadian International 
Development Agency. Both the Refugee Policy Group and the 
University of Manitoba have assisted the study. Complete or 
partial case studies include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, 
Ethiopia, Burundi, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
VARIETIES OF REPATRIATION
Generally, if international agencies and governments do 
not initiate, manage and organize a voluntary repatriation the 
international agencies refer to it as an unorganized or 
spontaneous repatriation. However, as the Tigray repatriation 
shows most clearly, the failure or inability to provide
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international repatriation assistance does not mean there is a 
lack of organization. REST, TPLF, and the Sudanese Commissioner 
for Refugees (COR) provided substantial organization. They had 
woefully inadequate resources, unfortunately, due to the lack of 
international participation.
To a certain degree, it is better to avoid labelling types 
of repatriation and to concentrate instead on examining the 
range of repatriation experiences. It is useful to think of 
types of repatriation as lying along several continuums or 
spectrums. Amongst the possible continuums would be (1) whether 
a repatriation is unassisted or organized and by which actors; 
(2) the degree to which a repatriation is purely voluntary, 
encouraged, induced, or forced; (3) whether it is an individual, 
small group, or more sizeable collective return; and (4) a 
political conflict spectrum reflecting the degree to which there 
has been a significant change in the original cause of flight. 
Today, most repatriation occurs under far from ideal conditions. 
The repatriations occur under conflict and raise serious 
questions of coercion and protection.
Some of the points along a repatriation under political 
conflict spectrum would be: (1) return after fundamental 
political change such as independence (Zimbabwe, Namibia);
(2) return after a political settlement or major political 
change (Nicaragua); (3) return after a political settlement that 
does not end the political conflict and which leaves the 
contending parties with substantial political and military power 
(Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Angola); (4) return to areas not
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controlled by the government of the country of origin (may be 
controlled by a rival political force or by local forces)
(Tigray, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Cambodia); (5) return to a 
country controlled by the government that originally1 caused the 
flight (Guatemala); (6) return caused by deteriorating political 
security conditions in the host country (the post-19'85 return 
from southern Sudan to Uganda, 1989-1991 return from| Somalia to 
Ethiopia); and, (7) forced return of impressed refugjees to a 
conflict zone (Khmer Rouge).
iREPATRIATION PATTERNS AND DECISIONS 
In examining refugee-stimulated repatriation under 
conflict it is necessary to take a split screen view of two 
interacting factors, the pattern of repatriation and the purposel
of refugee decision-making. These two factors interact and 
drive the repatriation process.
In our conceptual framework there are four main phases of 
repatriation: (1) the 'ricochet' effect; (2) relocation- 
stimulated repatriation; (3) community and alienation; and, (4) 
major repatriations. The pattern of these phases is' not rigid, 
the process may be drawn out or short-circuted. The progression
ithrough the phases may flow smoothly or be jumbled by events.
The key factors driving the events are the assistance decisions 
and attitudes of the host country, changing conditions within
I
the homeland, the location of the refugees in their refuge, and 
the evolution of refugee communities at sites where refugees are 
concentrated. Also influencing this process is the fact thatj
most borders are relatively porous allowing refugees to visit
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and communicate with their homeland.
Decision-Making
On one side of the split-screen is the nature and purpose 
of refugee decision-making which interacts with the pattern of 
repatriation. There are two points to note about refugee 
decision-making. First, not all refugees are alike; there will 
be differential responses to forced location often rooted in 
different levels of mobility, urbanization, education, and 
economic status amongst the refugees. Second, we are examing 
refugee responses over a long period of time. The refugee 
community will behave differently at the beginning, generally a 
conservative risk-aversive response, than years later when 
greater initiative and risk taking will be apparent.
Our view of refugee decision-making views the refugees as 
making "rational” choices amongst unsatisfactory options, 
striving for an outcome that achieves relative security and some 
small degree of control over their lives. We assume that 
refugee actions are purposeful; their behavior may be 
interpreted as directed to the attainment of a goal. Refugees 
make choices for some purpose, and we must understand those 
purposes. Indicating that a choice is "purposeful" or 
"rational" does not necessarily mean that it is careful or 
conscious, that it lists all alternatives and consequences, 
estimates and defines probabilities and preferences. Many 
people simplify complex decisions by relying on habit, instinct, 
simple cues, and trial and error. The assumption of purposeful 
choice implies simply that, after taking account of people's
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perceptions, values, and beliefs, we can model their decisions 
by asserting that they act as if they make such calculations." “
Although refugees are commonly thought of as powerless, 
and they are certainly relatively powerless, it is well to 
recall that the decision to flee, or to stay, or to return home, 
is an action and a choice. [The choice is often influenced by 
geography; those near the border cross it and become refugees; 
others, far from the border, flee to the cities and become 
internally displaced persons. Their status differs, but the 
cause of flight is often identical.] For almost everyone the 
process of becoming a refugee is a transition from relative 
security and prosperity to uncertainty and poverty.
The decision to flee obviously reflects the refugee's 
belief that his or her power over others and level of self- 
control are now inadequate to provide protection from insult, 
injury, iraprisionment or death. Thus, flight represents an 
attempt to utilize whatever power, control and mobility the 
person still possesses to escape from a threatening situation to 
safety. There are usually other alternatives available, to stay 
or to flee internally. Refugees make their moves to flee, to 
repatriate, to accept settlement or resettlement because of 
decisions that compare alternatives.
In comparing alternative decisions refugees attempt to 
conserve and strengthen their control over their own lives and 
to reduce the possibility that further stress will occur. The 
basic response of refugees is a conservative one to limit change 
and disruption. Not surprisingly, refugees seek security. They
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cling to old behavioral patterns, old institutions and old 
goals. In clinging to the familiar, refugees attempt to 
move the shortest distance not only in space to remain in 
contact with a familiar habitat, but also in terms of the 
psychological and sociocultural context of their lives.
Initially, refugees can be expected to follow a 
conservative strategy. They cope with the stress of flight to 
an unfamiliar habitat by clinging to the familiar and changing 
no more than is necessary. They attempt to transfer old skills 
and farming practices. They attempt to relocate with kin, 
neighbors, coethnics so as to recreate the security of an 
encapsulating community with familiar institutions and symbols.
In the "relocation" phase of repatriation, refugees consider 
the move to refugee camps or further inland to settlements as a 
threat to their identity. It would move them from a known to an 
unknown world, further away from kin and familiar territory.
"The refugees [Mozambicans] don't appear very happy at being 
sent further away from the border. They actually cross it from 
time to time, to 'stay in touch and see how the situation is 
developing.'"* Returning home to a previously established 
social identity with rights and obligations can be seen as 
allowing the refugee to retain more power and stability and 
control over his own life.
The passage of time is likely to alter the refugees' 
approach to decision-making but not the goal of the decisions-- 
security and control. Rarely will the transition stage, marked 
by a conservative response, be shorter than two years. Where
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refugees play an active role in reconstructing their lives and
communities and so reestablish a positive image of themselves, 
the transition stage may be relatively short.
The later stage of decision-making is marked by increased
i
initiative and risk taking (which may only be to pre-flight 
degrees of risk taking.] The turning point is when the refugees
j
have regained much of their former standard of living and degree 
of self-sufficiency. Local leaders emerge capable <j>f pushing
local interests vis-a-vis the hosts and government officials.
jThe initial dependency of the refugee community is abandoned and 
an outward-looking and dynamic leadership emerges. Refugees 
organize themselves into more effective political units for 
obtaining benefits from the external environment. This 
organization requires the passage of time, but also gives theI
refugees a sense of control over their own community. Such 
organizing can be encouraged by NGOs, by growing confidence in 
the international presence and delivery of supplies,j and 
enhanced by organizational skills of resistance-connected 
refugees. The refugees' willingness to take risks niay focus on
repatriation if the community's condition in the host country is
1hopeless, isolated, or precarious.
Conservative risk-aversive refugees will act as 
individuals and will avoid contact with government and
l
international agencies. [They will be suspicious of anything 
official.] They will repatriate spontaneously. Over time, as 
initiative and risk taking re-emerge in the refugee community,
f
the refugees will be willing to confront their hosts, their
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homeland, and the international community with requests for 
officially-sanctioned, but refugee-stimulated repatriation.
Patterns of Repatriation
On the other side of the split screen, actively 
interacting with the refugees' desire for security and some 
degree of control over their lives, are the events in exile: 
"ricochet" repatiations; relocation-stimulated repatriation; 
return by refugees alienated from the emerging refugee 
community; and, major repatriations.
Ricochet: If the exodus was sudden, such as a result of 
military action or a "stampede" away from danger, a substantial 
number of people who might not have felt personally threatened 
or whose sympathies were not in line with the majority of the 
refugees will immediately seek ways to return. These initial 
repatriations will be spontaneous and unassisted and can be 
termed "ricochet repatriations".
Relocation-stimulated repatriation: The next phase 
is the host government's round-up of refugees scattered along 
the border and their movement to refugee camps to facilitate aid 
to and control of the refugees. At this point, refugees must 
decide whether to accept host government control and reside in 
the camps or try to elude the authorities and find a place to 
live away from other refugees. For those who stay in the camps, 
repatriation will inevitably become a less immediate option.
But for those refugees who settle outside the camps, 
repatriation is more likely to be a viable alternative, 
especially if they are unable to find work in the country of
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asylum.
Community and alienation: One of the more interesting
common denominators found in the case studies is the formation 
of politically organized, cohesive communities by uprooted 
peoples. Rounded up by the host government and relocated to 
refugee camps refugees are placed in unaccustomed communal 
situations which may change their way of life and crowd them in 
amongst strangers. In these circumstances refugees show and 
impressive ability to organize and cohere as a new community 
with its own mores and values. Frequently, refugee 
organizations are formed that ally with insurgent groups. 
Refugees come to believe that their situation is a key part of 
the political equation in the struggle of their group for 
social, cultural or economic change.
Some refugees will be indiffernt or alienated from the 
emerging refugee community, its values and common cause. These 
aloof refugees, seeking control over their own lives, are 
candidates to move away from the camp or settlement or to 
repatriate. "We must not forget that, like governments, refugee 
leaderships are not immune to the attractiveness of repression 
in order to achieve a political goal or maintain stability 
within the community."
As time passes, the available space for repatriation is 
likely to increase. At home, the locus of the conflict may 
change; the levels of violence may decrease; political or 
economic changes may occur. The border may become more porous 
as a result of internal changes in the homeland. Cross-border
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trade may normalize, providing an opportunity for families in 
the camps and spontaneously-settled refugees to send "scouts" 
back to check on conditions and to find out if it is viable for 
small numbers of people to go back. Returns by internally 
displaced persons to particular regions will be carefully noted 
by refugees and may trigger some repatriation.
Inevitably, some scouts will report that people can return 
with a relative degree of safety. Gradually more and more 
people will begin to leave. They are generally people who are 
on the periphery of the mainstream refugee community, or those 
who feel they no longer "belong". The refugee organizations may 
oppose the return of these less committed refugees, feeling that 
repatriation somehow undercuts the political and/or moral 
position of the refugee community. Repatriations during this 
period may expand the political space at home, although not 
significantly.
Secondary relocation-stimulated repatriation: At some 
point, in almost every refugee situation, the host government 
will decide, or propose, to relocate or transfer refugees from 
refugee camps near the border to camps or formal settlements 
further inland. This relocation may be dictated by political 
concerns, as in the case of Guatemalans in Mexico, or 
operational concerns, as in the case of Sudan. Whatever the 
reason, the relocation decision forces the refugees to decide 
whether to accept the transfer and the disruption it is likely 
to cause to both the refugees' lives and to the established 
sense of community, or to leave the camps and either attempt to
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integrate into the surrounding communities or repatriate.
"Relocation, they feared, would sever their links with El 
Salvador and inevitably lead them to abandon any reasonable hope 
of one day returning home."7
A key consideration is the perceived breakup of the sense 
of community that has evolved in the camps. The emotional 
stress of having to move yet again and form yet another 
community prompts many refugees to choose to repatriate. While 
few refugees may cite the relocation as the primary cause, the
iIfact that a substantial number of returns begin when transfers 
start underscores the importance of this event. If more 
refugees show an interest in repatriation than the existing 
political conditions and organization of assistance allows, theni
organizational attitudes start to change, and agencies working 
with the refugees begin to actively seek ways to expand the 
space for repatriation.
The first organizations to actively assist repatriation 
are the refugee-controlled organizations. No longer are those 
who are repatriating deemed the "alienated"; many ar'e the core of the 
refugee community. The fact that many mainstream refugees are
ireturning, apparently successfully, serves to enlarge the 
political space in the homeland and draws the attention of 
outside organizations to the repatriation process. Governments
fon both sides of the border must now make decisions regarding 
the limits of their involvement. The host country will 
naturally seek to encourage repatriation, while the country of 




In the country of origin, the civil government, the 
military and various political, social, ethnic and economic 
groups may have different political agendas. Inevitably, as the 
number of returnees increases, the government will seek to 
either control the repatriation or benefit politically from the 
return. If the government wants to control the return, it will 
usually seek the participation of the UNHCR.
Major repatriations: UNHCR participation is the final
stage in the reptriation process. In response to governmental 
pressures (usually from the host government and then from the 
country of origin), UNHCR will begin to provide assistance, 
in some cases reluctantly. Whether or not this is carried out 
as part of a formal tripartite agreement may depend on the way 
the repatriation is perceived by the international community.
Once repatriation becomes formalized under UNHCR, two very 
divergent patterns may emerge. In some cases, a formal 
agreement will lead to a decline in repatriation because some 
refugees fear being registered and being brought to the 
attention of their government, while others may delay their 
return while they wait for assistance programs to be established 
and implemented. In other cases, however, while formal
repatriation agreements may produce little organized return,
/they can improve the political space for repatriation.
Tripartite agreements enable UNHCR and NGOs to operate in the 
country of origin, they spur development of civilian refugee aid 
agencies in the homeland, and they facilitate the refugees'
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ability to communicate home and develop better information on 
conditions. The large-scale unorganized returns to Mozambique 
and Afghanistan may reflect this process.
CONCLUSION: REPATRIATION UNDER CONFLICT
What is described above is a very unsatisfactory 
situation. The ability of refugees to take matters into their 
own hands and organize repatriations is a hopeful sign. But 
often they are forced into this position by hopelessness, 
danger, and lack of assistance. Iran has charged that: "For the 
refugees, reduced assistance constituted an attempt to force 
them to return to their country." What is the connection 
between malnourished refugee children in Malawi and "spontaneous 
repatriation" to Mozambique? The masivas to conflict zones in 
El Salvador grew out of the hostile, hopeless situation in the 
closed refugee camps in Honduras. Attacks on refugee 
settlements in Southern Sudan have driven hundreds of thousands 
of refugees back to Uganda.
The international community has failed to provide durable 
solutions for millions of refugees. It compounds this failure 
by repeatedly declaring that voluntary repatriation is the most 
desirable solution, and by failing to effectively promote the 
other two solutions— resettlement and local integration. The 
international community also fails to effectively promote 
voluntary repatriation. At the 1990 Extraordinary Executive 
Committee of UNHCR, several countries of origin, such as Angola, 
Ethiopia, and Somalia, complained bitterly that "refugees were 
awaiting the helping hand of the international community in
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order to return home" but the funding crisis had reduced 
repatriation programs.
Repatriation is not a panacea. Where is "home” for those 
in exile for thirty years or for those born in exile? Hostile, 
ill-prepared homelands still embroiled in conflict are not ideal 
arenas for re-integration and protection.
Nonetheless, despite significant protection worries, there 
is a need to actively promote voluntary repatriation, even under 
conflict. In an imperfect world that only offers long-term 
temporary asylum to most refugees, there is a need to assist 
refugees to go home. Rather than a passive international 
approach, repatriation should be actively promoted even before 
the formal end of hostilities. And repatriation should be seen 
as a tool for reducing confrontations along tense borders, for 
expanding or securing zones of peace and stability for 
returnees, and possibly as an encouragement to talks between 
between the adversaries.
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